Abstract. The SFLASH signature scheme stood for a decade as the most successful cryptosystem based on multivariate polynomials, before an efficient attack was finally found in 2007. This attack belongs to a new generation of cryptanalysis which targets geometrical properties of multivariate functions. It works particularly well on SFLASH due to its simple structure but further applications are emerging. Considering these new developments, it occurs that the general design principle of multivariate schemes itself might be questionable : can we effectively hide a specific multivariate function using linear maps ? In this paper, we keep focused on the simple example of SFLASH. We review its recent cryptanalysis and we notice that its weaknesses can all be linked to the fact that the cryptosystem is built on the structure of a large field. As the attack demonstrates, this richer structure can be accessed by an attacker by using the specific symmetry of the core function being used. In fact, this raises the general remark that, since the large field structure is only necessary to perform the secret operations, it indeed should not be encapsulated in the public key. Then, we investigate the effect of restricting this large field to a purely linear subset and we find that the symmetries exploited by the attack are no longer present. At a purely defensive level, this defines a countermeasure which can be used at a moderate overhead. On the theoretical side, this informs us of interesting limitations of the recent attack and provides us with additional elements to answer the general question defined above.
Introduction
Multivariate schemes are asymmetric primitives based on hard computational problems involving multivariate polynomials. Reference problems are for instance solving a system of multivariate polynomial equations, or deciding whether two sequences of multivariate polynomials are isomorphic. The research for such schemes originates from Matsumoto and Imai's work in the early 80s, but has really been active for a decade. The practical interest for considering such schemes, besides the obvious diversification effort, comes from their usual high performances which make them well-suited for implementation on small devices. On the other side, the area is young and much cryptanalytic effort is still to be done to understand well what their security might rely on.
Multivariate schemes are all based on a construction method inspired from McEliece [15] : an easy-to-invert multivariate vectorial function is transformed into a random-looking one by applying secret linear bijections on both variables and coordinates. Of course, such a linear hiding has the nice feature to be very easy to undo by the legitimate user, but it also has the drawback of leaking the invariant properties of the internal function. Whenever such invariant properties can be used in order to devise a cryptanalytic attack (for instance, unusual elimination properties of the variables allowing efficient Gröbner basis computation), one has to use additional transformations to destroy them. These additional transformations can be different depending on the encryption/signature usage intended.
SFLASH is a signature scheme proposed by Patarin, Goubin and Courtois [20] , following a design they had introduced at Asiacrypt'98 [18] . The easy-to-invert internal function of SFLASH is defined from a single variable polynomial over some field extension F q n and turned into a function from (F q ) n to itself by using the linear structure of F q n over F q . To allow efficient inversion, this function has a specific shape as a polynomial over F q n , namely this is a monomial which is inverted by raising to the inverse exponent, like in RSA. The basic McEliece-type hiding, i.e. using two linear bijections, of such a function was the initial proposal -known as the C* cryptosystem -of Matsumoto and Imai [14] , but it was later seen by Patarin [17] that the hidden monomial structure implies some algebraic properties of the public function which can be exploited by an attack to invert it without the secret key. However, Patarin, Goubin and Courtois later showed [18] that algebraic attacks can be very easily avoided by simply deleting a few coordinates of the public function; this additional transformation, initially used by Shamir [19] , is often referred to as the minus transformation. Schemes obtained from the application of minus to C* are termed C* -schemes; they are suitable for signature. SFLASH is a C* -scheme chosen as a candidate for the selection organized by the NESSIE European consortium [1] , and accepted in 2003 [16] .
Recently, Dubois, Fouque, Shamir and Stern discovered a new property of C* monomials which is almost not affected by the minus transformation, and which can be used to recover missing coordinates of the public function [6, 5] . As a consequence, all practical parameters choices for C* -schemes, including those of SFLASH, were shown insecure. The attack found by Dubois et al. is the most effective development of a new kind of cryptanalysis which targets geometrical properties of multivariate functions. It is the obvious demonstration that much structure might still be accessed even when algebraic attacks are ineffective. Consequences of this attack are of course a reevaluation of related cryptosystems and a more careful study of the properties of the internal functions being used. However it seems that the mere design principle of multivariate schemes is here in question : can we effectively hide a particular function such as a C* monomial using linear maps ?
Our results. In this paper, we review the recent cryptanalysis of SFLASH and we notice that its weaknesses can all be linked to the fact that the cryptosystem is built on the structure of a large field. As the attack demonstrates, this richer structure can be accessed by an attacker by using the specific symmetry of the internal C* function that can be perceived from even a small number of public polynomials. In fact, this raises the general remark that, since the large field structure is only necessary to perform the secret operations, it indeed should not be encapsulated in the public key. Then, we study the effect of restricting this large field to a purely linear subset, and we find that the symmetries exploited by the attack are no longer present. Indeed the symmetries of the C* monomial are fundamentally linked to the large field multiplication and do not hold when restricted to a non-multiplicative subset; we provide mathematical proofs explaining this phenomenon in detail. As we will see, this result conveys additional perspective on the general design of multivariate schemes.
Organization of the Paper. In Section 2, we give a brief introduction to SFLASH. In Section 3, we review its recent cryptanalysis [6, 5] . In Section 4, we show that the geometrical properties which are exploited by the attack do not hold when restricting the internal function to a proper subspace of the large field. In Section 5, we define a modified family of schemes which provably resist the attack. We discuss our results in Section 6.
The SFLASH Scheme
SFLASH is a combination of the McEliece-type hiding of a specific function initially proposed by Matsumoto and Imai as defining the C* scheme [14] and an additional transformation called minus initially proposed by Shamir [19] . It is therefore termed a C* -scheme.
The C* scheme
The C* scheme was proposed by Matsumoto and Imai in 1988. The starting idea of C* was to create easy-to-invert multivariate functions from special shape single variable polynomial over an extension field F q n , using the linear structure of F q n . The inversion operation must be easy to perform using a few multiplications in F q n but must correspond to a high degree multivariate operation whose computation is intractable for the appropriate parameters.
The most simple implementation of this idea is to use a single monomial over F q n :
where x can be identified with an n coordinates vector over F q by fixing some basis of F q n . The exponent 1 + q θ is chosen invertible modulo q n − 1 and raising to its inverse is inverting F . Since 1 + q θ has q-weight 2, F corresponds to a multivariate function from (F q ) n into itself of degree 2. On the other hand, the inverse of 1 + q θ has very high q-weight O(n) for prescribed values of θ [14] , and the inverse of F then corresponds to a multivariate function from (F q ) n into itself with very high degree O(n) and exponentially many terms. A C* scheme is built by transforming F with randomly chosen linear bijections S and T :
The resulting function P has the same multivariate properties as F , but the twisting provided by S and T hides the single variable representation which allows fast inversion. The function P is therefore used as the public key, and S and T are kept as the secret key. Since the public key is bijective, the scheme can be used for both encryption and signature. The C* scheme was shown insecure by Patarin in 1995 [17] . Although the plaintext x is a high degree function in term of the ciphertext y, Patarin showed that the pairs (x, y) satisfy many low degree algebraic relations, whose degree is independent of the security parameter n. These relations can therefore be computed in polynomial time and imply the success of an algebraic attack to invert the public key through Gröbner basis computation.
The existence of such algebraic relations is of course a consequence of the specific shape of the internal function. In fact, they are the images by the linear hiding of similar relations observed on the internal function F . Intuitively, these relations might be seen as a kind of redundancy between coordinates of the input and output of F , arising as a consequence of the structural specificity of the transformation made from one to the other; it appears as a common drawback of most internal functions used to design multivariate cryptosystems. Later, effective ways to destroy these algebraic invariants were investigated.
SFLASH
To avoid an attacker to possibly reconstruct existing algebraic relations on the pairs (x, y), a simple idea is not to provide the entire description of how these variables are related. The most easy way to realize this was used by Shamir in 1993 [19] and consists in simply removing a few coordinate-polynomials of the public key, say the last r ones where r is an additional parameter. When this modification is applied, the original pairs (x, y) should only be accessible at the cost of exhaustive search on the last r coordinates of y for each considered value of x. Furthermore, Patarin, Goubin and Courtois showed in 1998 [18] that for a C* scheme, the degree of algebraic relations between x and the partial y is quickly growing with the parameter r. Of course, the resulting scheme is no longer bijective but it remains surjective and it can still be used for signature without a performance loss. This family of signature schemes was introduced as C* -schemes by Patarin, Goubin and Courtois [18] . The public key of a C* -scheme consists of the n − r first coordinates
of an initial C* public key P = T • F • S with T and S as the secret key. A rationale for the parameter r is provided in [18] based on an attack method which attempts to derive linear equations on the coefficients of the missing coordinates ; choosing r with q r ≥ 2 80 is then required for a 2 80 security level. Besides, no algebraic attack is expected to succeed when r is not too small in regards to n, the initial number of polynomials. SFLASH is a C* -scheme chosen by Patarin, Goubin and Courtois as a candidate for the selection of cryptographic primitives organized by the NESSIE consortium in 2001 [1] . A first version of SFLASH featured a tweak to decrease the size of the public key; however this rendered the scheme insecure as shown by Gilbert and Minier [11] . A standard version was then proposed, with parameters q = 2 7 , n = 37, θ = 11 and r = 11; the signature length is 239 bits and the public key size is 15 Kbytes. This second version was accepted by NESSIE in 2003. A third, more conservative version was also proposed in 2003 [3] .
The Symmetry in SFLASH
The design of SFLASH was aimed at resisting algebraic attacks and stood challenging for almost ten years. However, in the last four years, a new kind of cryptanalysis for multivariate schemes has been developed based on geometrical properties of the so-called differential [10, 7, 8] . As defined in the initial paper by Fouque, Granboulan and Stern [10] , the differential transforms a quadratic function P (x) into its bilinear symmetric associate, denoted DP (a, b). The differential of P can be obtained by substituting monomials x i x j by a i b j + a j b i in the expression of P (if P is not homogeneous, terms of degree 1 and 0 are discarded). The interest of doing so is that DP is linear separately in a and b and its properties relatively to these variables can then be described in terms of linear algebra. Furthermore, when considering a multivariate scheme P = T • F • S, these properties have to be isomorphic to those of F since S and T are linear bijections.
Recently, Dubois, Fouque, Shamir and Stern showed a very efficient cryptanalysis of C* -schemes based on a class of geometrical invariants of the differential of C* [6, 5] . The attack exploits some hidden symmetry between the variables. This symmetry can be characterized by specific linear maps whose action on the differential is specific. The maps satisfying this property for the public key are of course related to those for the internal function F by the secret transformation S made on the variables. Furthermore, a small number of coordinates of the public key is enough to be able to compute them. Once they have been computed, the maps related to the public key can be used to perform the associated operations on the variables of the internal function F . The last step of the attack comes by noticing that these specific operations also satisfy a second, different symmetry property, between the variables and the coordinates of F . This second symmetry in turn allows to perform operations on the internal coordinates from operations on the internal variables. As a result, the linear maps extracted from the public key using the first symmetry can be used to generate new linear combinations of the internal coordinates thanks to the second symmetry. Finally, it is shown that these new coordinates can be used to complete the C* -public key into a full C* public key, which we know is vulnerable to algebraic attacks. Let us now describe this in more precise terms.
Skew-symmetric Maps with respect to the Differential
The differential of the internal C* function is :
When a and b are identified with n coordinates vectors over F q , DF is a bilinear symmetric function from (F q ) n × (F q ) n to (F q ) n . Each of the n coordinates of DF is a multivariate polynomial in the coordinates a 1 , . . . , a n and b 1 , . . . , b n of a and b respectively, which is linear separately in a and b, and where a and b play symmetric roles. Each such polynomial is written on the basis of terms a i b j + a j b i where i = j, so it has n(n − 1)/2 coefficients. Now, it is observed in [6] that linear maps consisting of multiplications by some element ξ of F q n have a specific action on DF . Indeed, it can be checked that
For the particular elements ξ such that ξ + ξ q θ = 0 (at least 1 is solution), the associated multiplication maps M ξ satisfy
that is, they are the skew-symmetric maps with respect to DF . The existence of non-trivial (i.e. not colinear to the identity) such maps is of course very unusual and even for a C* monomial it does not happen for all parameters. However, even when it does not happen, the initial identity can also be interpreted as a skew-symmetry property. Let us indeed define for any linear map M , the skew-symmetric action of M over DF as the bilinear symmetric function
Our basic identity infers that in the special case of multiplication maps, we have
where M ζ is the multiplication by ξ + ξ q θ . As a consequence, for any element ξ of F q n , the coordinate-polynomials of the bilinear symmetric function Σ[M ξ ](a, b) are linear combinations of the coordinate-polynomials of DF . Therefore, expressed in geometrical terms, multiplication maps have the specific property to leave unchanged under skew-symmetric action the subspace spanned by the coordinate-polynomials of DF . Note that this property is very strong because the subspace spanned by the n coordinates of DF has dimension at most n while for a random linear map M , the coordinates of Σ[M ] might be any polynomials in the whole space of bilinear symmetric polynomials of dimension n(n − 1)/2 and are very unlikely to all be confined in the tiny subspace spanned by the coordinates of DF . The public key P of a C* scheme of course inherits of the above properties; the only difference is that since the variables of F are transformed from the variables of P by the linear bijection S, the linear maps that play with regards to P the role of multiplications with regards to F are the conjugates S −1 • M ξ • S. Now, a crucial point is : although the latter maps depend on the secret bijection S, they can be computed from their characteristic property with regards to the public key P . Indeed, let us show this for the simpler skewsymmetry condition; we want to find the linear maps M which satisfy the equation
Since M appears linearly in the above expression, this clearly defines a set of linear equations in the coefficients of M . Furthermore, for each coordinate of DP , the equation expresses the vanishing of a bilinear symmetric polynomial whose coefficients are linear expressions in the coefficients of M ; each coordinate of DP therefore provides us with n(n − 1)/2 linear conditions on the n 2 coefficients of M . As confirmed in practice [6] , even a marginal number of coordinates of the public key is sufficient to solve the space of skewsymmetric maps. This means that the skew-symmetric maps can be determined from even severely truncated C* -public keys without any special difficulty. Solving the more general skew-symmetry condition follows similar principles although more theory is involved; we refer the reader to the original paper [5] for the details.
Consequences
The properties described above allow an attacker to compute from a C* -public key conjugates S −1 •M ξ •S of multiplications maps M ξ . This of course is very annoying because these maps depend on the secret bijection S and were initially considered as secret information. Furthermore, as shown in [6] , the nature of these maps is an additional problem: they give access from the public world to the internal field multiplication. Indeed, once a conjugate M ξ is known, composing the public key with it is equivalent to performing the multiplication by ξ on the variables of the internal function F :
The problem is that internal field multiplications have a specific effect on the internal monomial : since F is multiplicative, multiplying its input by ξ is equivalent to multiplying its output by F (ξ). As a consequence, composing the public key with M ξ actually performs the multiplication by F (ξ) on the coordinates of the internal function :
As we can see, this is again equivalent to generating a new C* -public key with T − sub-
. It is shown in [6, 5] that the polynomials of this second C* -public key can be used to replace the missing polynomials of P − . Then, algebraic attacks can be applied again, and the one-wayness of the public key is broken. The symmetry property between the variables and coordinates of the internal function, characterized by the commutation of F with multiplications, is of course fundamental for the purpose of the attack on C* -schemes. However, the initial breach is the existence of linear maps which can be computed from the public key although they contain secret information. Even without the second symmetry, some attack could exist which uses pairs of identified multiplications and conjugates to recover the secret bijection S. In the sequel, we investigate the possibility to destroy the skew-symmetry property of C* -schemes.
Breaking the Symmetry
The skew-symmetry property is symmetry between the variables of differential. As we have seen, for C* -schemes, the linear maps which are associated to this symmetry are connected to the internal field structure, namely they are multiplications by elements of F q n . In principle, this means that the existence of the skew-symmetric maps of C* -schemes is tied to the internal field structure. So, the natural question is : would skew-symmetric maps exist if the internal field structure were truncated, i.e. restricted to a subspace of it ?
Projection Breaks the Skew-Symmetry Property of C* -schemes
Suppose we consider the internal function F restricted to some proper subspace H of F q n . We denote F H this restriction. The skew-symmetric maps with respect to the differential DF H of F H are by definition the linear maps M H from H to itself which satisfy :
We expect the solutions M H to this condition to be the restrictions to H of the skewsymmetric maps w.r.t DF which map H to itself. When H is an arbitrary subspace, we do not expect non-trivial multiplications M ξ to map H into itself. Then, the only solutions to our condition should be the scalar multiples of the Identity :
Let us now show that our expectation is correct using mathematical arguments. First, we characterize the linear maps M H which are skew-symmetric with respect to DF H by transforming the above condition (2) in a condition with respect to DF . That is, we embed the above condition over H in a condition over F q n . We can embed M H into a linear mapM H which is M H over H and zero elsewhere. The same way, we can embed the Identity over H into the projection map to H, denoted π H . Then, (2) is equivalent to :
Therefore, the linear mapsM H are special solutions to the condition
They are those solutions M which are left unchanged by composition with π H :
Our method to determine the linear mapsM H is then clear : we first find the solutions M to the condition (3), and then find those which are left unchanged by composition with π H . Before we do this, let us note an alternative characterization of the linear mapsM H : they are the common solutions of the two conditions
The first condition is the skew-symmetry condition with respect to DF only considered for elements of H. The second condition is the skew-symmetry with respect to DF (π H , π H ). Both conditions have additional degrees of freedom compared to the skew-symmetry with respect to DF , and are simultaneously satisfied by the only linear mapsM H .
The Solutions to Condition 3. As we can see, obvious solutions to Condition 3 are the maps M ξ •π H where M ξ is skew-symmetric with respect to DF . Since our condition is greatly overdetermined, we do not expect any other solutions. This is confirmed experimentally. In the most simple case when H is a hyperplane, we can actually give it a mathematical proof.
Lemma 1.
Let H be a hyperplane of F q n and DF be the differential of a bijective C* monomial. The linear maps M which satisfy the condition
are of the form M ξ • π H where M ξ is skew-symmetric with respect to DF .
Proof. The idea of the proof is to replace M and π H by their expressions as sums of qpowerings, and to express our condition as the vanishing of a polynomial in a, b over F q n .
We have M (a) = n−1 i=0 µ i a q i and π H can be expressed as the projection orthogonally to some element u, where the orthogonality is defined relatively to the trace product (see [13] for a definition). Recalling tr(a) = n−1 i=0 a q i and that tr(a) is an element of F q , we have π H (a) = a − tr(au)u. To simplify, we consider in the sequel u = 1. We can rewrite our condition : A(a, b) − B(a, b) = 0, where
Both expressions are written on the basis of symmetric terms of the form a q i b q j + a q j b q i and their respective coefficients are :
From these expressions, we easily resolve µ 0 = 0 and µ i = ξ for all i = 0 where ξ satisfies ξ q θ + ξ = 0 (see Appendix A for the details). Therefore,
where M ξ is skew-symmetric with respect to DF (which is obtained from ξ q θ + ξ = 0). ⊓ ⊔ Solutions which are Left Unchanged by Composition with the Projection. As we have shown, the linear mapsM H which correspond to the skew-symmetric maps with respect to DF H , are the solutions to Condition 3 which are left unchanged by composition with π H . In the previous section, we have shown that the solutions to this condition are of the form M ξ • π H , where M ξ is a multiplication by some element ξ. Maps of this form are unchanged by composition with π H if and only if M ξ commutes with π H , or equivalently, if and only if M ξ maps H into itself. In this case, since for any ξ, M ξ is bijective, we have
Our goal is to show that, except for specific choices of H which are very sparse, the only elements ξ satisfying this property are the scalar multiples of 1.
As a first step, we notice that the elements ξ satisfying Property (5) form a multiplicative group, independently of the choice of H. Therefore, they actually form a subfield of F q n and H is a linear space over this subfield. Finally, the subspaces H for which Property (5) is satisfied by non-trivial elements ξ are subspaces over intermediate subfields of F q n .
As a second step, we upperbound the probability that a random subspace H of a prescribed dimension s is a subspace over an intermediate subfield of F q n . (In this case, we say that H is degenerate). We show that this probability is negligible in terms of q and n.
Lemma 2. Degenerate subspaces of F q n only exist at dimensions s not coprime with n. In particular, degenerate hyperplanes never exist. The proportion of degenerate subspaces in F q n of a prescribed dimension is always at most O(q −n ).
Proof. When H is a subspace over F q r , its dimension over F q is a multiple of r. Since r must itself be a divisor of n, degenerate subspaces only exist at dimensions s not coprime with n. For instance, we deduce that degenerate hyperplanes never exist since n − 1 is always coprime with n. Let r be a common divisor of s and n. It can be shown that the number of subspaces of dimension s in a vector space of dimension n is of the order of q s(n−s) [12] . Then, the number of F q r -subspaces of dimension s/r in F q n is of the order of q s(n−s)/r . The number of degenerate subspaces of dimension s in F q n is dominated by the latter quantity considered for the smallest common factor r of n and s. Since the smallest possible value of r is 2, the proportion of degenerate subspaces of dimension s in F q n is at most of the order of q −s(n−s)/2 . Since s(n − s) is minimal for s = 2 (2 is a common factor of s and n), the searched proportion is dominated by q −(n−2) and therefore q −n asymptotically.
⊓ ⊔ Application to the General Skew-Symmetry Property of C* -schemes. In the preceding paragraphs, we have shown that restricting the internal function F to some proper subspace H of F q n destroys the simple skew-symmetry property (2) . In this paragraph, we consider the general skew-symmetry property of C* -schemes. This property expresses that there exists non-trivial linear maps which leave the space spanned by the coordinates of DF unchanged under skew-symmetric action. The linear maps satisfying this condition are the whole space of multiplications. Using similar techniques as before, we can show that this property considered for the restricted function F H admits only trivial solutions. We refer the reader to the appendix for the details.
Experimental verifications
We checked experimentally, for various C* parameters n and θ, the effect of restricting the internal function to a randomly chosen subspace H of various dimensions s. For instance, for parameters n = 36 and θ = 4 (which are more interesting than those of SFLASH since they are not prime numbers), we obtain the following dimension for the solution space of the general skew-symmetry condition as the number of coordinate-wise conditions increases.
# conditions s = 0 s = 1 s = 2 s = 3 s = 4 s = 9 
Projected C* -schemes
Based on the results of the preceding section, we are led to define a new family of schemes that we call projected C* -schemes. As we will see, these schemes actually consists in hiding a C* monomial using non-bijective linear maps. We next define the (ad-hoc) computational problems on which the security of these schemes is based. Finally, we discuss possible choices of parameters and suggest one concrete choice with performances comparable to SFLASH.
Description. A projected C* -scheme is defined as follows. Let n and θ define a bijective C* monomial F (x) = x 1+q θ , x in F q n . Given a representation of F q n , F is identified with a quadratic function from (F q ) n to itself. Let r and s be two integers between 0 and n.
The key generation algorithm performs the following operations: (1) Randomly choose two bijective linear maps S and T from (F q ) n to itself. These linear maps are identified with (n, n) matrices which are evaluated from the right. (2) Remove the last r rows of T and the last s columns of S. The resulting submatrices are denoted S − and T − . (3) Computê
The generated functionP is used as the public key and the secret linear bijections S and T are used as the secret key. Note thatP is a quadratic function from (F q ) n−s to (F q ) n−r . To find a preimage by the public function of a given message m, the legitimate user first pads m with a random vector m ′ of (F q ) r and compute the preimage of (m, m ′ ) by T • F • S. If this element has its last s coordinates to 0, then its n − s first coordinates are a valid signature for m. Otherwise, he discards this element and tries with an other random padding m ′ . When r > s, the process ends with probability 1 and costs on average q s inversions of F . In practice, r is chosen a significant fraction of n to make the public key resistant to algebraic attacks; s can be chosen as small as 1 to destroy symmetries arising from the internal field structure. As for C* -schemes, the significant value of r makes projected C* -schemes only suitable for signature, since reviewing all possible paddings m ′ is not efficient. Finally, we mention that projection already appeared in the literature as a possible modifier for multivariate schemes [2, 4] but was not seriously considered as a defensive measure.
Possible Angles of Analysis. As usual for multivariate schemes, the security relies on several ad-hoc computational problems. The first problem is solving the public system of quadratic equations. Since s is chosen small, this is about as hard as solving the initial C* -system. The second problem is recovering the functional decomposition of the public key or at least some information on the secret maps S − , T − . There is no efficient strategy to solve this problem in general [9] , and the attack by Dubois et al. which falls into this category for C* -schemes is here prevented by the projection. Remains the strategy consisting in removing the projection i.e. recovering the public key into a valid C* -public key. Showing this to be possible is actually the new challenge opened by the new family of schemes.
Parameters. n, θ, r are chosen following the rationales for C* -schemes. We choose s = 1 as it induces the minimal factor q on the secret operations. The value of q can be chosen small but, at constant blocksize, this requires a larger value of n and therefore a larger public key. As a possible trade-off, we propose q = 2 4 , n = 74, θ = 11, r = 22 and s = 1. For these parameters, the signature generation is 16 times slower than for SFLASH and the public key size is doubled. These are still attractive features for small device implementation.
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide additional insight on the recent cryptanalysis of SFLASH by exhibiting a simple modification which provably avoids the attack. Our study shows that the attack against SFLASH has deeper roots than the mere fact that it is based on a C* monomial : the attack is made possible because the large field structure is embedded in the public key and is stopped when it is no more the case. Then, we realize that, indeed, one might not hope to hide effectively a particular function defined on a large field using linear bijections; this might at most be achievable in some security range using compressive linear maps. But then, is it still possible to build a practical cryptosystem in this setting ? At the present state, we can still define a modified family of C* -based schemes which is of practical interest. Analysis of this most simple case would probably yield additional understanding of the ways to distinguish a specifically-built multivariate function and would provide further insight on the very possibility to obfuscate such a function using linear maps.
A Complement to the Proof of Lemma 1
In this section, we provide the details of how we resolve the coefficients µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 of M from the condition A(a, b) − B(a, b) = 0. Let us recall that bijective C* monomials only exist in characteristic 2.
From the coefficient of a q θ b + ab q θ we get:
Similarly, from the coefficient of a q i b + ab q i , for any i = 0, θ, we get:
and from the coefficient of a q i b q θ + a q θ b q i , for any i = 0, θ, we get:
When n ≥ 4, there is an element i such that i = 0, θ, −θ mod n, and therefore we get from (7) and (8):
Using this equation with (6), we get:
where ξ satisfies ξ q θ + ξ = 0. For a bijective C* monomial, θ ≥ 1 and n/ gcd(θ, n) is odd. Then, θ is distinct from −θ modulo n (otherwise 2θ is a divisor of n and n/ gcd(θ, n) = n/θ is even). Using (7) with i = −θ, we get: µ 0 = 0, and finally µ i = ξ for any i = 0.
When n = 3, we again have θ distinct from −θ modulo n for a bijective C* monomial. Equation (7) becomes:
and Equation (8) becomes:
Using (6) in the second equation, we get µ 0 = µ θ + µ −θ and comparing with the first equation, we get:
Then we easily find µ θ = µ −θ from (6) and µ 0 = 0 from the first equation.
When n = 2, there are no bijective C* monomials.
B Projection Also Breaks the General Skew-Symmetry Property
As before, we denote F H the restriction of the C* function F to a proper subspace H of F q n . Note that F H is a function from H to F q n . A linear map M H from H to itself satisfies the general skew-symmetry property with respect to DF H if and only if there exists an associated linear map N M H from F q n to itself such that
As before, we can embed this identity over H into an identity over F q n . We denoteM H the linear map from F q n to itself which is M H over H and zero elsewhere. We denote π H the projecion to H. Identity (9) is equivalent to
The linear mapsM H are special solutions to the condition
Obvious solutions to Condition (10) are the maps M ξ • π H where M ξ is multiplication by an element ξ of F q n . Since Condition (10) is greatly overdetermined, we do not expect any parasitic solutions, and this is confirmed in practice. When H is a hyperplane, we can actually give it a mathematical proof (see below). Then, the maps M ξ • π H which are left unchanged by composition with π H are those for which H is closed by multiplication by ξ. We know from Lemma 2 that except for negligibly sparse choices of H, the only elements ξ which satisfy this property are the scalar multiples of 1. Lemma 3. Let H be a hyperplane of F q n and DF be the differential of a bijective C* monomial. The linear maps M for which there exists a linear map N M such
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1. To simplify, we also consider u = 1. Let us also recall that bijective C* monomials only exist in characteristic 2. We rewrite our By summing (B) and (D) we obtain for any i = −θ, 0, θ, 2θ:
We call η this constant. Using (B) and (E), and (C) and (D), we also resolve:
Using (F), we deduce: δ i = 0 for any i = −2θ, −θ, 0, θ, 2θ, and using the above:
From the equations above we deduce, ν −2θ + ν −3θ = 0 and then ν −4θ = 0, and similarly ν 2θ + ν 3θ = 0 and then ν 4θ = 0. Then by an easy induction using δ i = 0 for the concerned indices, we get ν ±(3k+1)θ = 0 and ν ±(k+1)θ = ν ±(2k+1)θ for all k ≥ 1. Considering these conditions for iterated values of k gives ν i = 0 for all i but 0. Getting back to the γ i 's, we obtain γ i = η for all i but 0 and θ, and η = γ 0 + γ θ . It results that all µ i for i = −θ, 0, θ are equal; we call ξ this constant, we have:
We are left at finding µ −θ , µ 0 and µ θ . After simplifications, we get from (B) and (D):
ξ + γ 0 = ν 0 ξ q θ + γ θ = ν 0 which implies γ 0 = ξ q θ , γ θ = ξ and ν 0 = ξ + ξ q θ = η. From (A) and (C) we get:
Then, replacing γ 0 by its value η + γ θ in (C) we obtain: µ −θ + µ θ + µ ⊓ ⊔
